Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

Chevron Oil Company, Doing Business As
Standard Oil Company of California v. Beaver
County, A Legislative Corporation of The State of
Utah, Hyrum L. Lee, Eugene H. Mayer, Howard .J.
Pryor, Constituting The Board of Commissioners
of Beavercounty : Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Grant H. Bagley and Leonard J. Lewis; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Chevron v. Beaver County, No. 11317 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3453

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

TA BLl~ OF CONTBJNTS
S'rATBJl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE______________

Page
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT________________________

1

RFJLlEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL____________________________

2

S'l'ATEl\lENT OF FACTS__________________________________________

2

POINTS RELIED UPON____________________________________________

6

ARGUl\lJ1}NT

7

POINT L THE ZONING RBJSOLUTION
OB' BEAV:i'JR COUNTY CONFISCATES THE
PLAINTIFF'S PROPI~RTY BY PREVENTING ANY ECONOf.IIC USE THEREOF, AND
VIOLATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTI'rUTIONS ------------------------------------------

7

POINT II. 'rHFJ ZONING ORDINANCE
lS AHBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, DISCRHIINATORY AND VOID AS APPLIED
TO TH:B~ PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY____________________

18

POINT lll. THE PROVISIONS FOR H-I
HIGHWAY SBJRVICE ZONE IS A LEGISLATIVE DETER~1INATION THAT THE PUBLIC WELFARE R BJQUIRED FREEWAYORIENTED PROPERTY TO BE CLASSIFIED IN THAT ZONE________________________________________________

28

POINT IV. THE JUDGMFJNT IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT AND
IS A NULLITY _----------------------------------------------------------

32

SFMJ\IARY --------------------------------------------------------------------

33

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page
CASES CITED

American National Bank, etc. v. Chicago,
195 N.E.2d 627 ··········-·····--····--··-··-······-·-········----·····
17
Arverne Bay, etc. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587........ 7, 10
Dorsey, etc. v. Davis, 180 Atl. 396..............................

7

Dowse v. Salt Lake City, 123 Utah 107,
255 P.2d 723 ····--·······-··--···············-···--·········--·········
8
Dowsey v. Kensington, 177 N.E. 427..........................
7
Eaton v. Sweeney, 177 N.E. 412..................................

7

Elizabeth v. Waterford, 26 N.W.2d 788......................

18

Ervin v. Ann Arbor, 34 N.W.2d 11............................

7

Ex Parte White, 234 Pac. 396 ............................ 24, 28, 29, 31
Forbes v. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767 ............................. 7, 17, 18
Gaddis Investment Company v. Knight,
3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284·--··--···············--·---·---·
-·
32
Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307,
8
358 P.2d 368 ·····-··········--·····-····--··-··--------·--·--·····-·-·
Gibbons and Reed Company v. North Salt
Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431P.2d559 .... 8, 17, 18, 21
Glen Rock Realty v. Board of Adjustment,
192 A.2d 865 ......... -·--·-······-····--······-·······-··············--·
18, 24
Henle v. Euclid, 125 N.E.2d 355 __ ·····--·······-··--···-·-·----·18, 23
In re Lieb's Appeal, 116 A.2d 860..............................

24

In re N.E. Corner, etc., 186 N.E.2d 515.·--·---··-·--······-·

24

Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah
2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 ... ·--····---···--··-···--------············32
LaSalle, etc. v. Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609 ........ -·-·-·-----·

18

Liebling v. Deerfield, 171 N.E.2d 585 .............. ----······ 18, 21

TABJ,g OF CONTENTS -

(Continued)

Page
Loesh v. Newburg, etc., 100 N.E.2d 543______________________ 7, 16
Long v. Highland Park, 45 N.E.2d 10________________________

18

l\Iarshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,
141 P.2d 704____________________________________________________________

8

Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513 __________________________ 17, 27
1\Iidlancl, ek v. Knox County, 115 N.E.2d 275._______

18

National Brick Company v. The County of
Lake, 137 N.E.2cl 494_______________________ ______________________

17

Naylor ,., Jacksonville, 133 So. 114____________________________

7

v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 300,
410 p .2d 764 ...... --------------------------------------------------------

18

~aylor

Nectow \'.Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447,
72 L. Ed 842 ____ ·------------------------------------------------------7, 8, 20
People v. City of Rockford, 2 N.E.2d 842________________
28
People v. Kirby, 2 N.E.2d 842______________________________________

18

People v. Skokie, 97 N.E.2d 310__________________________________

18

Pleasant Ridge v. Cooper, 255 N.W. 371____________________

7

Prentice v. American University, 214 F.2d 282________

7

Pritz,.. Messer, 149 N.E. 30-----------------------------------------21
Richardson v. Warwick, 221 A.2d 460 ________________________ 18, 23
Roselle v. Livingston, 122 A.2d 506____________________________

7

Rowland v. Racine, 271 N.W. 36----------------------------------

7

Seattle, etc. v. Rob~rge, 278 U.S. 116,
49 S.Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 210________________________________________

8

State v. Bedford, 134 N.E.2d 726 ______________________________ 7, 24, 28
Stevens v. Huntington, 229 N.E.2d 59L__________________

7

Rundlun v. Zoning Board, 145 Atl. 45L____________________

7

TABLE OF CONTENTS~ (Continued)
Page
Tews v. \Voolhi::;er, 185 N.E. 827 ... ··-···················-····7, 12
Trust Co. v. Chicago, 9G N.E.2d 499 ................ ····---·

7

Vernon Park Realty v. J\lou11t Vernon,
121 N.E.2d 517 ······-·-····--·-·---·-··-·
.................. 7, 1-!, 17, 18
Wickham v. Becker, 274 Pac. 397 ........................... 24, 28, 30
STATUTES

Fourteenth Aml•ndment, Federal Constitution........

7

Section 7, Article I, State Constitution.___________________

7

Rule 52, Rules of Civil Procedure ...................... --------

32

l 7-27-1, U.C.A. ( 1953 )--------······--·-·-···-·······-············--·---

8

17 -29-9, U .C .A. ( l!l53) ··-····-----·---·-------·-·-···-······--··---------- 2

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHEWRON OIL COIIIPANY, doing
business as STANDARD OIL
COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
--vs. BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative
corporation of the State of Utah,
HYRUM L. LEE, EUGENE H.
MAYER, HOW ARD .J. PRYOR,
coustitnting the Board of Commissioners of Beaver Ccnmty,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 11,317

APP·ELLANT'S BRIEF
srrATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to obtain a judgment declaring the
zoning- resolution of Beaver County to be inYalid as applied to the plaintiff's property and to require the County Commissioners to issue to the plaintiff a building permit to construct aud operate a service station on its
property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lo\ver court held the zoning resolution to be
rnlid and dismissed the action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court and a judicial determination that the zoning ordinance is invalid as applied to the plaintiff's
property, also a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to issue to plaintiff a permit authorizing it to
construct and operate a service station on its property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, enacted in
May, 1959, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17-29-9,
U.C.A. 1953, classifies the unincorporated area of the
county into nine separate zones or use districts (Ex. 1).
Most of this area is public domain and state-owned land
(Ex. 1). No master plan was en~r designed or adopted
either by the Board of Commissioners or the Planning
Commission and no surYey or study of the physical, social or economic conditions within the area was evrr
made, so far as the records disclose ( R. 16). 'rhe only
plan for zoning the territory is incorporated in the resolution itself (R. 12 and 16). The only map which appears
to have any connection with the resolution is designated
as "Zone Map of Beaver County, Utah" and is physically attached to Exhibit 1 (R. 17). It is not signed or
attested or otherwise authenticated, but apparently was
adopted by designation (p. 27, Ex. 1).
The resolution provides detailed and exhaustive
regulations controlling the use of the property and the
location of buildings and other structures. The general
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objectives and characteristics of each zone are specifically
<lesigna ted (Ex. 1).
Only two of the zones provided for in the ordinance
are of particular concern in this litigation. These are
the G-I Grazing Zone (p. 36, Ex. 1) and the H-I Highway
Serviee Zone ( p. 43, Ex. 1). The primary use proscribed
in the Grazing Zone is the raising of livestock. Any use
which would "thwart or militate" against the raising of
linstock is expressly prohibited. This zone is to be characterized by large tracts of open range land ( p. 36, Ex. 1).
The primary use established by the Highway Service
Zone is ''for commercial and service uses to serve the
traveling public." It is to be located along interstate
higlnrnys, several miles from already-established commu11ities, where service facilities are required to meet the
needs of the traveling public. It is characterized by restful surroundings and off-street parking space where the
traveling public may find rest, comfort and necessary
serYices. Representative of the uses within this zone are
automobile filling stations, public garages, cafes, trailer
courts, motels and caretaker dwellings. The objectives
of this zone are to promote safety on the highway and
connnience to the traveling public. None of the unincorporated territory was zoned as H-I Highway Service
property (Ex. 1).
Plaintiff's property is classifird under the ordinance
as Grazing Zone property. It consists of a vacant plot
450 fert by 500 feet fronting on Interstate Highway I-15,
at the Pine Creek Hill Interchange, 21 miles north of the
Town of Beaver (Ex. 10). It is oriented to the inter-
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state freeway in such maimer that a south-hound Yehicle
can leave the freeway from the outside lane, detour a
short distance to the property and then re-enter the freeway, merging into the south-bound traffic (Ex. 10). No
other property in the county, except that of the companion plaintiffs, has such access to the interstate freeway
(Tr. 17-18). In addition, it presents an excellent view to
motorists for se,-eral miles. It is an ideal location for a
service station and has a Yery substantial valuP for that
purpose (Tr. 367).
The Phillips Petroleum Company and Desc•ret Investors Group own laud adjoining the plaintiff's property. They brought an action to obtaiu the same relief
as that sought by the plaintiff and the two cases were consolidated for trial.
The zoning resolution provides for the creatiou of
a Board of Adjustment and defhws its jurisdiction and
functions (Ex. 1). No such Board has h0en appointed.
Plaintiff petitioned the Board of County Commissioners to rezone its property by classifyiug it as Highway Service Zone property. The Board rPferred the petition to the Planning Commission, which held a public
hearing at which the plaintiff and its companion plaintiffs
appeared and presented evidence iu support of the petitions. The Planning Commission recommended that the
petitions be denied (Ex. 17). It based its recommendation upon the grounds that plaiutiff's proposed operations on their property would require an additional cost
to the county in providing police and fire protection
and other governmental services, and that a commercial
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development at Pine Creek Hill would seriously endanger
the economic stability of existing communities, particularly Beaver City, thereby menacing the tax base. As a
final prop, it was stated that plaintiff's project was un11ceessary since the services it proposed to offer could be
made available in or near existing communities (Ex. 17).
In answer to interrogatories, the defendants defended the ordinance upon essentially the same grom1d as
that relied upon by the Planning Commission.
'11 lic unincorporated area of Beaver County embraces

approximately 1,665,680 acres, most of which is either
mountains or desert (Tr. 336-7). There are about 200
farms scattered throughout the area (Tr. 343). Except
for these farms, the territory is either public domain or
state-owned land (Ex. 1 and R. 45-48). The population
of the county according to the latest census is 4,235;
1,653 of these inhabitants reside in the Town of Beaver,
1,556 in the Town of Milford and about 550 in the Town
of ?\Iincrsville (Pre-trial Order). The three towns mentioned are incorporated and have not enacted any zoning ordinances. There are no commercial enterprises of
any kind in the unincorporated area of the county except
a small, recently-built service station which is located
just outside the city limits of Beaver.
After allowing the case to be dormant for nearly a
year &nd a half, the trial court made and entered its judgment entitled "Memorandum Decision,'' adjudging the
ordinance to be valid and dismissing the action. No
findings of fact were made or entered and no opinion was
rendered.
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POINTS RELIED UPON
POIN'r I
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY CONFISCATES THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY BY PREVENTING ANY
ECONOMIC USE THEREOF, AND VIOLATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.
POINT II
THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, DISCRIMINATORY AND VOID AS APPLIED TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY.
POINT III
THE PROVISIONS FOR H-I HIGHWAY
SERVICE ZONE IS A LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT THE PUBLIC WELFARE REQUIRED FREEWAY-ORIENTED
PROPERTY TO BE CLASSIFIED IN THAT
ZONE.
POINT IV
THEJUDGMENTISNOTSUPPORTEDBY
FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS A NULLITY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER
COUNTY CONFISCATES THE PLAINTIF'F 'S PROPERTY BY PREVENTING ANY
ECONOMIC USE THEREOF, AND VIOLATES BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72
L.Ed. 842; Arverne Bay, etc. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587;
Tews v. Woolhiser, 185 N.E.827; Dawsey v. Kensington,
177 N.E.427; Stevens v. Ifontingto1i, 229 N.E.2d 591; Ervin v. Ann Arbor, 34 N.W.2d 11; Prentice v. American University, 214 F.2d 282; Pleasant Ridge v. Cooper, 225 N.W.
371; Rowla1Y1d v. Racine, 271 N.W.36; Dorsey, etc., v.
Davis, 180 Atl. 396; Naylor v. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114;
8undlim v. Zonin,g Board, 145 Atl.451; Rosenthal v. Bedford, 134 N.E.2d 727; Roselle v. Livingston, 122 A.2d 506;
Vernon Park Realty v. M aunt Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517;
Forbes v. Hubbard, 180 N.E. 767; Trust Co. v. Chicago,
96 N.E.2d 499; Loesh v. Newburg, etc., 100 N.E.2d 543;
Eaton v. Sweeney, 177 N.E. 412.

The controlling question to be decided on this appeal
is whether the provisions of the zoning ordinance restricting the plaintiff's property to grazing purposes and
prohihiting any use which would "thwart or militate"
against that purpose deprives the plaintiff of its property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and/or
Rection 7, Article I of our State Constitution. Through-
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out the entire proceedings before the County Commi:ssio11ers, the Planning Commission and the trial court,
plaintiff contended that the answer to this que:stion must
be in the affirmative. Appella11t now renews this contention.
Section 17-21-1, U.C.A., HJ53, provides that Boards of
County Commissioners are empowered to provide for
the physical development of the unincorporated territory
within the county and for the zoning of all or any part
thereof in the manner provided in Chapter 27. The decisions of this Court have placed definite limitations upon
the powers granted by this statutP. f-lec Gibbous and
Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329,
431 P.2d 5;":J9; Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,
141 P.2d 704; Dowse v. Salt Lake City, 123 {;tali 107, 255
P.2d 723; Gayland v. Salt Lake Ccnrnty, 11 Fi ah 2c1 :io7,
358 P.2d 3G8. The Supreme Conri of the United States
has also definitely limited this zoning power. See N ecfou:
v. Cambridge, 277 U.S .183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed 842;
Seattle etc. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed.
210. The limitation applicable to the ca:se at bar and
\\'hich the above authorities establish is that a zoning restriction which deprives a property owner of substantially all economic or profitable use of his property cannot be sustained. Such a restriction amounts to confiscation and deprives the ow11er of his property without
due process of law.
That the ordinance renders the plaintiff's property
worthless is beyond controversy. In it:s present status,
it is less than worthless because it is lrnnkned h~, taxa-

tion and cannot he made to produce any income or profit
whatever. It must remain idle until freed from the injunction issued by the zoning ordinance.

It is of no significance that the property has never
been used except for grazing purposes. The establishment of the interstate freeway has completely changed
its character. It has automatically become unsuited to
grazing purposes and peculiarly adapted to commercial
use. Its value has increased severalfold.
Physical conditions and circumstances make plaintiff's property unique. It is oriented to the freeway in a
\Hl)' \\·hich enables the motorist to leave that thoroughfare from the outer lam·, stop for motoring needs and
senices, re-enter the freeway and merge into the traffic
moving in the same direction. No other property in the
County has such attributes except the adjoining property of the associated plaintiffs. It also abuts on the
planned Milford Highway. There is no comparable commercial site for several miles north of Pine Creek Hill
or East on I-70. 'rhis combination of construction and
natural conditions make the plaintiff's property peculiarly adapted to serve the freeway motoring public.
It is clear that the present case involves a factual
situation not heretofore considered by this Court in any
of the zoning cases that have been decided. Other courts
have repeatedly been confronted ~with analogous facts
and circumstances and have uniformly held that a zoni11g restriction \Vhich deprives an owner of all profitable
or economic use of his property, as this ordinance does,
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is confiscatory and violates property rights guaranteed
by our State and Federal Constitutions.
Arnerue Bay, etc. v. Thatcher, supra, is an rxreptionally well-reasoned case aud has become a leadiug authority upon the constitutioual limitatious 011 zoning
power. The facts involved are exactly aualogous to those
presented by the present appeal. Until 1928, the Afferne
Bay property was zoned "unrestricted." By amendment
of the ordinance in that year the property was rezoned
"residential." It was vacant and ullimproved, and formerly had been farming land. The reRideutial zone in
which it was located abutted upon a street for a distaucc
of four miles and the area was undevrloped rxcept for a
few old farm buildings. Only thrre of these were located
on the abutting street within a distauce of a mile. One
of them was used as a cow stable aud the other as a dairy
office. In the vicinity of the plaintiff\; property the
city had established an iuciuerator which gaYe off offensive fumes and odors, and within a few hundred feet a
sewer emptied into an open creek. This facility also
gave off nauseating odors which permeated the plaintiff's
premises. There had been no homes constructed in the
district since the amendment of the ordinance and the
prospect of the district becoming a residential area in
the foreseeable future was quite dim.
Traffic on the abutting highway had greatly increased
and plaintiff's property became a highly desirable location for a service station and could be used very profitably for that purpose. It was evident that if the properiy could not be devoted to such use, it would remain
idle indefinitely.
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The plaintiff petitioned the Board of Adjustment
for a variance to permit the use of the property for a
service station. The petition was denied. The plaintiff
appealed first to the intermediate and then to the highest court of appeals. Both courts sustained the decision
of the Board. See 247 App. Div. 889, 286 N.Y.S. 785, 3
N.E.2d 457. The plaintiff then brought suit in the District Court to have the ordinance adjudged to be null and
void as to the plaintiff's property, upon the ground that
it Yiolated both the Constitutions of the State of New
York and of the United States. The relief prayed for
was granted and the contention of the defendant that the
matter was res adjudicata was overruled.
The res adjudicata plea was disposed of by the proposition that the conditions which rendered the property
u11suitable for residential purposes were not peculiar to
the plaintiff's property and, therefore, the Board of Adjustment did not abuse its discretion. This determination did not foreclose plaintiff's contention that the ordinance deprived it of its property without due process of
la\\r. Upon this point, the Court held:
"If the state or the city, acting by delegation from
the state, had plenary power to pass laws calculated to promote the general welfare, then the
validity of the ordinance might be sustained; for
'we have nothing to do with the question of the
wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances.'
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 393, 47 S.St. 114, 120, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54
A.L.R. 1016. The legislative power of the state is,
however, not plenary, but is limited by the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of the state. It may not take private prop-
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erty without compensation e\·en for a public purpose and to adnrnce the gPneral welfare. Eaton v.
Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.J<J. 412. 'The protection of private propNty in the Fifth Amendment
presupposes that it is wauted for public use, hut
provides that it shall not lw taken for such use
without compensation. A similar assumption is
made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. Hairston v. Danville & -Western R.
Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605, 28 S.Ct. 331, 52 L.Ed. 637,
13 Ann.Cas. 1008. ·when this seemingly absolute
protection is found to he qualified by the police
power, 'the natural tendency of human nature is
to extend the qualification more and more until at
last private property disappears. But that cannot he accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.' "
The principle established by the cit<•d case rn that
economic evolution alters the adaptability of property to
a particular use and that a municipality cannot constitutionally freeze property to a use to which it is not suited.
This is precisely what Beaver County has effected hy the
present zoning resolution.

Tews v. Woolhiser, 185 N.E. 827, is another case in
which highway construction has altered the use to which
property is adapted and thereby rendering void a zoning
ordinance which forever condemned the property to an
uneconomic and unprofitable use. rrhe property was located in Block A of a subdivision which was zoned for
residential purposes. Due to challf.,ring circumstances,
Block A had become unsuited for residential purposes.
One of these circumstances was the widening of the street
on which the plaintiff's property abutted. A great in-
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crease in traffic resulted from this street improvement
and plaintiff's property became a very desirable location
for a senice station. The evidence showed that for residential use plaintiff's property was worth $100, but for
scnicc station purposes, it was worth $33,000. Plaintiff sought to have the ordinance amended to permit the
construction of a service station on its property. The
application was denied. It then brought suit to have the
ordinance declared invalid upon the ground that it violated hoth the state and federal Constitutions. The trial
court granted the relief prayed for and the municipality
amwalecl to the Supreme Court of Illinois. That Court
said that the question to be determined was, "Can an
ordinance be sustained as a Yalid exercise of the police
power which zones property to a use to which it cannot
be put and thereby renders it useless and valueless for
au~' purpose while so zoned~'' The question was answered thus :
" ( 4-G) It must not be overlooked that zoning
which courts can approve must have as its basic
purpose the setting aside of areas of property for
specific uses. Zoning which admittedly limits
property to a use which cannot reasonably be
made of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such
property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of o\vnership therein. Regardles~ of the opinion of zealots that property may
properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without
compensation, such principle finds no support in
the genius of our government nor in the principles
of jristice as we know them. Such a d?ctrine shocks
the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that
property remain open and unused, then certainly
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the public, and not private individuals, should
bear the cost of reasonabk• compe11sation for such
property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. It
lies not within the power of a municipality to so
zone property as to render it worthless. Such is
not zoning - it is confiscation."
The case of Vern.on Park, etc. v. Mount Vernon, 121
N.E. 2d 517, is also undistinguishable from the case at
bar. The property involved in this case was an eighty-six
thousand square foot tract known as the Plaza. It adjoined a railroad station and was surrounded by businesH
property. In 1922 it was zoned for business and in 1927
was rezoned residential. Plaintiff bought the property
in 1951, knowing that it was zoned rcside11tial. He applied for a variance to permit the construction of a shopping center and when this application was denied,
brought suit to compel the town to rezone the property.
·while this suit was pending, the tow11 rezoned the property to restrict its use to the parking of automobiles. The
plaintiff then amended his complaint, claiming that the
ordinance confiscated his property and was unconstitutional and void.
The property had always been used for parking automobiles except a small area upon which a service station
was located. The value of the property as a shopping
center was several hundred thousand dollars, while its
value for parking was only a fraction thereof. It had
no value for residential purposf>s. The municipality
contended that the use of the property for a shopping
center would create a traffic congestion to an intolerable
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extent and that the public welfare demanded the restriction. The Court disposed of this contention as follows:
''However compelling and acute the community
traffic problem may be, its solution does not li~
in placing an undue and uncompensated burden on
the individual owner of a single parcel of land in
the guise of regulation, even for a public purpose.
True it is that for a long time the land has been
devoted to parking, a nonconforming use, but it
does not follow that an ordinance prohibiting any
other use is a reasonable exercise of the police
power. While the common counsel has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting
the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare,
General City Law, Consol. Laws, c. 21, §83, such
power is subject to the constitutional limitation
that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably, Nash ville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294
U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949; Brous v.
Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E. 2d 503, and this is
so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the
use of the property for any purpose for which it
is reasonably adapted. Arverne Bay Construction
Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587, 117
A.L.R. 1110. By the same token, an ordinance
valid when adopted \Vill nevertheless be stricken
down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory,
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 51 S.Ct.
252, 75 L.Ed. 690, such for instance, as when the
greater part of its value is destroyed, Dowsey v.
Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 211, 177 N.E. 427,
86 A.L.R. 642, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. Eaton v. Sweeny, 257
N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412."
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In Loesh v. Newburg Heights, 100 N.E.2d 5543, the
plaintiff owned a tract of land in the village of Newburg
Heights consisting of 46 acres which had never been improved or developed in any way. Part of it had been
used as a public dump, and it was divided by a large
ravine through which a creek carried sewage. A large
industry was established on some adjoining property, and
the area generally was industrial in character. Under
the zoning ordinance, part of plaintiff's property was
zoned residential and the rest of it commercial. Plaintiff petitioned the zoning board to rezone its property
industrial but the board declined to do so. 'l'he property
was totally unsuited for either eommercial or residential
use but had a very substantial value for industrial purposes. The Court held that the zoning ordinance did not
promote the public health, safety or puhlic welfare and
therefore violated the constitutional rights of the owner.
"The ordinance in question does not promote the
public health, safety or welfare of the community
by requiring lands in the midst of a heavy industrial area, lacking pavement and utilities, in part
used as a public dump and elsewhere traversed by
a creek into which raw sewage is emptied, to be
used for residential or commercial purposes. This
ordinance passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of merely an arbitrary fiat."
Defendants argued in the lower court that plaintiff
was precluded from asserting that the ordinance corifiscated its property since it acquired the property after
the ordinance was passed. This Court repudiated tlmt
argument while the present case was under advisement.
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In Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 19
Utah 2<l 329, 431 P.2d 559, it was held:
"Defendant seems disturbed over the fact that
plaintiffs acquired the parcel after the 1957 ordinance went into effect. We are not sympathetic
to that position since use, not ownership, of the
land is the concern of the zoning authorities.''
Other courts have consistently refused to accept
defendants' contention. See America1i National Bank,
etc. v. Chicago, 195 N.E.2nd 627; Forbes v. Hubbard, 180
N.E. 767; National Brick Company v. The Courity of
Lake, 137 N.E.2d 494; Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d
513; Vernon Park, etc. v. Mount Vernon, 121N.E.2d517.
A somewhat similar argument was made based on the
fact that plaintiff's property had at one time been part of
a large tract which was adapted to grazing use. Defendants then say that this voluntary severance destroyed the
utility of the property for grazing and that plaintiff is
precluded from asserting that the ordinance confiscates
the property. The blind spot in this position is that there
is no connection between the severances and the newly
created appurtenance. The subdivision of the property
occurred after the freeway was established and the new
use created. It is immaterial that the old use has become
valueless.
The case at bar is a clearer case of confiscation than
any of those ab-0ve cited. The construction of the interstate freeway completely altered the plaintiff's property
so far as its utility is concerned by creating a new and
<listinet appurtenance. It converted the property into a
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valuable business site. The ordinance destroys this newly created attribute and is a direct \·iolation of both State
and Federal Constitutions.
POINT II.
THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ARBITRARY, UNREASON ABLE, DIS CRIMIN ATORY AND VOID AS APPLIED 'l'O THE
PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY.

Gibbons and Reed v. North Salt Lake, 19 Utah 2d
329, 431P.2d559; Long v. Highland Park, 45 N.E.2d 10;
People r. Skokie, 97 N.E.2d 310; People v. Kirby, 2 N.E.2d
842; Midland, etc. v. Knox Cnunty, 115 N.E.2d 275; Lieuling v. Deerfield, 171 N.E.2d 58:-i; F'orbes v. Hubbard, 180
N.E. 767; Glen Rock Realty v. Board of Adj11stme11t, 192
A.2d 865; Vernon Park, etc. r. Mt. Vernon, 121 N.E.2d
517; Richardson v. Warzcick, 221 A.2d 460; Hrnle v.
Euclid, 125 N.E.2d 355; Elizabeth v. Waterford, 26
N.W.2d 788; LaSalle, etc. v. Chicago, 125 N.E.2d 609.
Even if freezing the propert)- to grazing uses did not
amount to confiscation, the ordina11ce is nevPrtheless arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory as applied to the
plaintiff. It is an abuse of the police power conf0rred
upon the county to zone property.

In Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2(1
764, this Court declared:

~300,

410 P.2d

''The foundational reason for zoning is to regulate the growth and development of the city in an
orderly manner. Among the objectives to he
served is to avoid mixiug together of industrial,
commercial, business a1Hl residential use8; the
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prevention of undue concentrations of people in
certain areas under undesirable conditions· making provision for safe and efficient transportation;
for recreational needs; and for the enhancement
of aesthetic values, all in order to best serve the
purpose of promotiug the health, safety, morals
and g-eneral welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
'l'hese objectives of zoning must be kept in mind in
determining whether the ordinance is reasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory. The physical characteristics of
the area are also of controlling importance. They negate
the reasonableness of the present ordinanee as applied
to plaintiff's property. Instead of providing for the
physical development of the unincorporated area of Bea\·er County, the ordinance blockades that development
by preventing the plaintiff from establishing a business
<'nterprise which will generate a very substantial amount
of both direct and indirect tax revenue and provide much
needed employment in a territory where the tax base has
lieen static for many years and employment deteriorating.

Iu addition to these contributions to physical development of the area and the public welfare, plaintiff's
project at Pine Creek Hill will facilitate interstate commerce and the use of the freeway generally by providing
easily accessible products and services. All of these public benefits are to be had without cost and without creating damage, injury, harm or evil consequence.
It would he difficult to find a region less amenable
to zoning than the unincorporated area of Beaver County.
There is practically nothing in this territory upon which
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the legitimate objectives of such legiHlation can operate.
There are no industrial, commel'cial or business establishments and, therefore, nothing to he separated, segregated or regulated. No such projeets are even on the
horizon, so far as can now he seen. \Vith only a few lnmdrecl people scattC'recl over a \·ast desert area, there is
no need to be alarmed about undue concC'ntration of people under undesirable conditions. There is not even a
suggestion from any source that plaintiff's operations at
Pine Creek Hill would militate against Hafc and efficie11t
transportation.
Admittedly, the area contains re>creational facilities
and aesthetic values. These could not be either damaged,
promoted or preserved by restricting the plaintiff's property to grazing purposes. Permitting its use fol' a roa<lside service station would injun' nobody or damage any
property.
The only justification for restricting the lawful use
of land is that public welfare requires it. Without this
foundation, the restrictive enactment is u11reasollahle and
void.
"The goYernmental power to iHtc>rfere hy zoning
regulation'l with the general rights of the landowner by restricting the character of his use is not
unlimited and other questiolls aside such restriction cannot be impose1l if it does not hear a substantial relation to the public health, t·mfety, morals, or general welfare." Ner·tow v. Camuridgr,
278 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. .J-47, 7~ L.Ed. 842.
Furthermore, the ordinance must pl'omot<' the public wdfare in a realistic and substantial <kgT0e aml if the gain
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to the public is small compared with the hardship imposed on the property 0Wl1er, the exercise of the police
power is arbitrary and unreasonable. In Liebling v.
Deerfield, supra, it is said:
"It has long been established that zoning classifications must bear some real and substantial relationship to the public welfare, health or safety;
and where the gain to the public is small as compared to the hanlship imposed upon the owner, no
valid basis for the exercise of the police power
exists. Atkins v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. 2d 287,
163 N.E. 2d 826; LaSalle National Bank v. County
of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E. 2d 65."

In Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, the Court said:
"If the ordinance <liscloses no purpose to prevent
some public evil or to fill some public need and
has no real or substantial relation to public health,
morals and safety, it must be held void."

'l'he Supreme Court of Utah has declared:
''The right to regulate the use of property within municipal limits is limited for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals and the general welfare of the community . . . Thus, after
considering all the factors involved, including the
existing use of the property, the availability of a
natural resource, the severe loss to both the fee
owners and the public as compared to the relatively small inconvenience to owners in that neighborhood, we conclude that there is evidence in the
record to support the trial court's decision that
the zoning ordiuance as enforced against the
plaintiff's' property is an invalid exercise of the
police power.'' Gibbons and Reed Company v.
North Salt Lake City, supra.
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In the lower court the plaintiff, by written interrogatories, required the defendants to point out wherein
the restriction 011 the plaintiff';,; property imposell h)- thP
zoning resolution would promote the public welfare, or
wherein the use of the property for sen-ice station purposes would be harmful or injurious to anyone. The answers were that they had employed a professional planning consultant to assist and advise the Cou11ty Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners, and that the Board was informed (obviously by this
consultant) and they bcliewd that the use of the plaintiff's property for service station purposes would divide
the existing and anticipated expansio11 of the "near future commercial complex'' in the county to such an extent that it would be deprind of the advantages of urbanization, and "the entire commercial complex" would
deteriorate, commercial development would be disastrously scattered, the tax base of the cou11ty would be
damaged, and community life would deteriorate, also that
the cost of governmental sen·iees would increase. Defendants were further adYised and believed that publir
necessity did not require the commercial development of
plaintiff's property since existing facilities and space for
additional facilities are so near to the plaintiff's property. This same alleged justification for freezing plaintiff's property to grazing use was given by the Planning
Commission.
The "near future commercial complex" referred to
hy the Board is the influx of tourists and increase of traffic generated by the interstate freeway whieh will Pxtend
across the United States when the eonnection of I-70 at
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Cove Fort is completed. No other commercial activity
appears on the horizon or has been mentioned by any of
the defendants. The zoning ordinance was, according
to the Board, designed and enacted to prevent the fragmentization of this freeway-oriented business and to concentrate it into established communities. The only established community to which this business could be directed
is the To-vvn of Beaver. In other words, the ordinance
was enacted to eliminate competitors for the freewaygenerated business and to give the establishments in the
town a monopoly of this considerable enterprise. Both
.J. Frank Smith, the Chairman of the Board, and Dale
Despain, the architect and designer of the ordinance,
testified positively to these purposes and objectives.
This is a clear case of abuse of the zoning power.
The authorities, without conflict, hold that zoning
authority is not a vehicle for regulating competition or
creating monopolies and that municipalities have no
proper concern with economic laws of supply and demand or who may or may not engage in a lawful business.
In Henle v. City of Euclid, 125 N.E.2d 355, it is held:

''Zoning ordinances cannot be concerned with
questions of economic rules of supply and demand.
Such an issue has no place in this kind of action.
~oning ordinances are not the media through
which restrictions may be placed on who may
engage in legitimate enterprise."
Again, in Richardson v. TV arwick, 221 A.2d 460, the
Court said:
"\Ve pointed out there and we reiterate now that
zoning lehrislation was never intended as a means
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of controlling competition in an area. Comrwtent
evidence of the existenc·e of a 11eed or a demand
for a proposed nse is alwa rn c1emonstrativ0 that
the zoning board's grant is. in the public i11terest.
:b~vidence, however, that there ar0 existing facilities which would render the same s01Tice as tlw
proposed use is not com1wtent unless it can be
shown that to allow the proposed use would result
in conditions that would be inimirnl to the public
health, safety, morals and welfare. Among such
conditions would be traffic congestion, depreciation of surrounding property and other deleterious factors.''

In Glen Rock Realty Co111pa11y v. Board uf Adjustment, 192 A.2d 865, the Zoning Board attempted to justify an ordinance \Yhich zoned property suitable only for
commercial purposes as residential property upon the
ground that a commercial use of plaintiff's property
would '' fragmentize our central business clistriet without adding materially to the convenience of our citizens."
The Board specifically decryed "the disbursal of buying
power into peripheral areas.'' The Court repudiated the
attempt to justify the ordinance upon any such ground.
Other cases to the same effect are: Rx Partc TVliite,
234 Pac. 39G; TVickham v. Brc-ker, 274 Pac. 397; Ju re
Licb's Appeal, 116 A.2cl 860; Roseutltal v. Bedford, 1:3-±
N.E.2d 737; In re N.E. Corner, etc., 186 N".E.2d 515.
Whether plaintiff's operntio11s at Pim' Creek Hill
coukl adversely affect property values in the Town of
Beaver is a matter of pure speculation. It is not possible
for plaintiff to intercept any northhoun<l traffic as it has
already passed the Town of Bea vcr and furth0r the property is not oriented to that traffic. According- to stncli<':::
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made and experience m other areas, freeway motorists
are very reluctant to leave the freeway for motor supplies or services. They will stay on the freeway until
they reach roadside service facilities ('l'r. 285). These
are loeated only at intervals such as Pine Creek Hill and
large terminal cities or towns. As applied to the present
situation, freeway motorists will bypass the Town of
BcaYer and obtain their supplies and services at Cedar
City, thus rendering the present ordinance for the most
part ineffective to concentrate the business in the Town
of Beaver (Tr. 285). If as the defendants fear, "the
near future commercial complex'' will be scattered and
fragrrn~11tized, it will be brought about by the freeway,
ancl not by operations at Pine Creek Hill.
The contention of the Board that plaintiff's proposed
<levelopment would increase governmental costs is not in
areorcl with the facts. The county does not furnish any
!teat, light, power, sewer, sanitation, water communirat ion or transportation service of any kind. It does not
l'\'C'll have any fire prevention facilities.
Plaintiff's operation would require no inspection, supervision or police
protection, since it is loeated in the open desert more than
twenty miles from any habitation or business establishment. The only government cost that would be involYed is the cost of assessing the property for taxation
purposes.
The contention that the needs of the freeway motorisb; can he supplied from establishments in the Town of
Bean•r and in the small commercial area adjoining the
town is likewise without factual foundation. None of
such establishments have the freeway access available at
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Pine Creek Hill. Furthermore, the Board has no lawful
authority to regulate business convenience and necessity.
Defendants concede that a service station at Pine Creek
Hill would be a great convenience to freeway motorists
and would definitely facilitate both intra and interstate
commerce.
No one can deny that the proposed installations at
Pine Creek Hill would be a definite commercial asset to
the county. They will increase both direct and indirect
tax revenue and provide employment which will support
several families. All of these benefits are to be had with
practically no cost to the government. They will greatly
increase after the opening of I-70.
There is uo evidence whateYer to indicate that the
plaintiff's proposed project would endanger the public
health, safety, transportation, peace, happiness, morals
or well-being of the community or any other part of the
public. It could not conceivably affect adversely land
values or aesthetic qualities of any of the surrounding
area. In these circumstances the question, whether the
use of the plaintiff's property for commercial purposes is
detrimental to the public welfare, is a matter about which
reasonable minds cannot differ.
The public welfare is not confined to business interests in the Town of Beaver. It embraces all present an<l
future inhabitants of the area including, what is important in this case, the stranger at the gate.
The certain and very considerable public benefits to
be had from plaintiff's proposed i1westments and operations rn far outweigh the insignificant and remotely prob-

27
able detriment to a lirnite(l group of property owners as
t oleave no justification whatever for freezing plaintiff's
property to a use which is less than worthless.
Defendants may argue that the determination of the
zoning authorities that the restriction upon the use of
plaintiff's property is necessary to promote the public
welfare', is conclusive and not subject to review by the
Court. Such cannot be the law. If it were, there would
he no limitation upon the zoning power and it would be
futile to contend that any zoning restriction is unreasonable or illegal.
·whether the zoning restriction imposed upon the
plaintiff's property enhances the public welfare presents
a question of law which can be determined authoritatively
only by this Court. The principle is clearly stated in
Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So.2d 513:
"(2) In Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla.
676, 1 So.2d 642, 646, we held that 'In each case
where an attack is made upon the validity of a
zoning ordinance, insofar as its provisions apply
to limit and restrict the litigants' property, as in
the case at bar, a mixed question of law and fact
is presented.'

'' ( 3) The Chancellor heard all of the testimony
with reference to the nature of the property involved, its size, its location, a description of the
surrounding community and the uses other than
as a hospital to which the property might be put.
After the presentation of all the evidence of this
nature the decision as to whether the restrictions
were r~asonable or unreasonable was a conclusion
of law to be determined by the Court from the
facts presented."
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See also State v. Bedford. 134 N.E. 2d 726; People,
cte. v. City of Rockford, 2 N.K2cl 842.

POINT III.
THE PROVISIONS FOR H-I IIIGHW AY
SERVICE ZONE IS A LEGISLATIVFJ DETERMINATION THAT THJiJ PUBLIC WELFARE REQUIRED FHFJEWAY-ORIENTED
PROPERTY TO BE CLASSIFIED JN 'rHAT
ZONE.
Ex Parle ffhifl', 234 Pac. 396; Wickham v. Becker,
274 Pac. 397.

It has already been noted that no comprehensin
plan for zoning the uniucorpornted area of Beaver County was ever adopted or approved hy either the Planning
Commission or the Board of Commissioners, and that
the onl~r plan for the zoning of this territory is that whieli
has been incorporated in the zcming resolution itself.
"\Vhen plaintiffs inquired by written intPrrogatories why
no property along the freewa~· had been classified into
the Highway Service Zone, the answer was that then• "·as
no present necessity for such classification, but that such
necessity was anticipated to oecur at some future date
and the Board desired to be in a position to make the
classification without amending thP resolution. If there
were any doubt that the JH"O\·isions of the resolution
creating the Highway Servif'e Zo11e is a legislative determination that the public welfare n•quirC's that some property along thl' freC'way hC' classifil'd as Highway Zone
property, the C'xpl:matiorn; gin'll h~- the Board i11 its answers to interrogatories remon• it.
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The explanation that the time had not arrived for
Highway Service zoning is a sham and a smoke screen.
Grazing zone<l property could not, of course, be rezoned
Highway Service without amending the ordinance. The
real reason for omitting any property from Highway
Service Zone was to force freeway motorists into the
Town of Beaver to obtain their needed accommodations
and service.
In the case of E.i: Parte TVhite, supra, the Supreme
Court of California decided this exact point. The zoning
or<liua11ce of the City of Atherton provided for two districts, one of which was designated as an unrestricted district ancl the other as a residential district. In the unrestricted district, commercial structures of any lawful
kind were allowed. No commercial structures \Yere allo·wed in the residential district. The only property
classified as unrestricted district property was a small
area upon which a service station was constructed. The
plaintiff constructed a real estate office on a lot located in
the residential district. He was prosecuted for violating
the zoning ordinance, and the Supreme Court of Califoruia helcl that the ordinance was invalid because the action
of the Board in adopting the zoning resolution was a
legislative determination that the public welfare required
that appropriate parts of the city be classified as unrestricted property. vVe q note from the opinion as follows :
"It appears in the instant case that the board of
trustees undertook to zone the town into two districts, one of which was devoted to residential uses
and the other to business uses. This was in effect
a legislative finding that the maintenance of both
,.,uch districts was necessary to the public welfare.
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It was the duty, therefore, of the board of trustees
when zoning the town to make adequate provision
for both such uses. That adequate provision for
the business district was not made is at once apparent. It is true that some provision was made
for business; that is to say, 1-1/10 acres out of
2,500 acres was designated as an 'unrestricted district' in which buildings to be 'devoted to any lawful use' might be constructed. But it is apparent
from the fact that the 'unrestricted district' was
already fully occupied by a gasoline station and a
restaurant to the exclusion of new business uses
that the board of trustees was limiting the 'unrestricted district' to lmsiness enterprises already
established and to the exclusion of any future
business development. The ordinance in effect
grants a monopoly to the business establishments
already situate in the 1-1/10 acres of the 'unrestricted district.' In other words, under the guise
of regulating business and segregating it to a particular district, the ordinances in fact prohibits all
business save and except that of the favored two
already established.''
The case of TYickham v. Becker, supra, is another
well-considered case holding that the division of a city
into different zones is a legislatiYe determination that
public welfare requires that some property be classified
under each of the zones in order to prevent discrimination
and rendering the zoning ordinance i1wa1id. The City of
Piedmont was divided into three zones by the zoning
ordinance. Plaintiff's property was zoned residential
and had been used for that purpose for a considerable
period. Changed conditions in the city rendered her property unsuited to residential purposes and made it very
valuable for commercial purposes. Only two very small
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areas were classified as business property and these were
already in use for business purposes. The Court held
that the effect of the zoning ordinance was to freeze existing uses and therefore create a monopoly. The zoning
ordinance was held to be discriminatory and void. The
decision was based upon Ex Parte White, sitpra, and the
Court quoted from it. Continuing, the Court said:
''The situation presented here, with respect to
the creation of a business monopoly, is to all intents and purposes the same as the one existing
there. Here, too, the legislative body of the city
adopted a zoning ordinance creating both residential and business districts, which, as there stated,
was in effect a determination that both such districts were necessary to the public welfare. Consequently, as there held, it was the duty of the
legislative body to make adequate provision for
both such uses. This it failed to do; but, on the
contrary, as was done in the Atherton case, the
municipality limited the unrestricted district to
business enterprises already established, to the
practical exclusion of any further business development.''
The professional planner who designed this ordinance and sold it to the County Commissioners fully realized that the only possible foundation upon which zoning
this vast desert area could rest was the opening of the
interstate freeway. He realized also that the public welfare required that facilities to meet the needs of travelers
on the freeway must be established. His zoning plan
prO\'ided for these facilities. The Board adopted it and
then nullified it by failing to classify the property according to the plan.
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POINT IV.
THF~ JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTI~D BY
FINDINGS OF FACT AND rn A NULLITY.

Gaddis Inresfmeut Cnmpauy v. Knight, :1 Utah 2d 43,
278 P.2d 284; Joh11so11 Cnrpnratinn v. Peterson, 18 Utah
2d 260, 420 P.2d 615.

Rule 52 of the Rules of CiYil Procedure requires thr
Court to find the facts specially and state separately it8
conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury. The Conrt made no finding of fact
on any issue.
Rule 52 is in effoct a mandate to th0 trial court to
make a specific determination of the issues of fact and
a separate determination of the law. The cases abon
cited hold that a judgment enterr'd without this dl'termination is a nullity and must be rncated.
Parties to a lawsuit are entitled to a judicial determination of their eontron•rsy. Tl1e trial judge in this
case has failed completely to perform this duty. There iR
nothing in the record to indicate any judicial consideration of the facts or the law. Appan'ntly the couclusiorn;
of law and decision \\·ere simply pulled out of the drawer.
There is no conflict in th0 evidence and there is no
O"enuine
issue with respect to auv• material fact. In this
b
posture of the case the trial court should be directed to
enter findings of fact, conclusions of la\\· and judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.
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SUMMARY
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, as applied to
plaintiff's property, confiscates it and violates rights
guaranteed by both the State and Federal Constitutions.
Apart from constitutional considerations, the resolution
is an abuse of the zoning power conferred upon the Board
of County Commissioners by the statutes of this state.
It does not promote the public welfare but is detrimental
thereto. It blockades the commercial dewlopment of the
area aml interferes with interstate commerce. The freezing of plaintiff's property to grazing use is a departure
from the plan adopted by the Board for the physical
development of the area so as to promote the public
welfarr. It was enacted to prevent competition and
create monopoly. It is unreasonable, discriminatory and
YO id.
'rhere has been no judicial determination of the contronn.;y between the parties and the judgment is a nullity aud must he vacated. The case should be remanded
with directions to make and enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment as prayed for in the plaintiff's complaint.
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